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UNDP and the "Pre-investment Vacuum"
by Brian Johnson 1
Technical Assistance and capital investment are generally
thought of as distinct concepts, though the former is widely
recognised as often being an important component of the latter.
The description "pre-investment" as a category of development-
enhancing activity has, however, always been problematic. "Pre-
investment" as used to describe a broad range of activities, first
cropped up in UN development jargon in the mid-i 950e. As a
concept, it rapidly gained currency in development institutions
beyond the technical assistance-providing TiN specialised agencies.
The reason for this is not hard to divine. During the public aid
burgeoning of the late 1950e, the exoass of available resources
over feasible-looking projects was very evident, and this "gap" was
to continue throughout the 1960e, in some sense persisting today.
But the idea of evolving separate and speoialised institutions
for pre-investment and investment had little to do with the widely
perceived pre-investment gap. It emerged from the political
requirements of one particular agency: the tiN Special Fund (after
its 1965 merger with the expanded Programme of Technical Assistance,
the UN Development Programme), In a recent monograph2K. W. Taylor,
who was until recently chief of the Development Finance Service of
TIWDP, has described some of the results of the political compromise
which produced the UN's pre-investment agency. General Assembly
resolution 1240 (xiii) which created the Special Fund, was the
bargaining outcome cf the poor nations desire to create STJffFED
(Special United Nations Fund for economic Development, which was to
be a recipient-controlled development fund into which all nations
would pay a percentage of their GNP each year), and the rich
nations' unwillingness to contribute a multilateral aid schene on
such a scale and under such conditions. The functions of the
Special Fund had, therefore, to be clearly differentiated from
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conventional technical assistance, at the insistence of the poor
countries, and from capital investment, at the insistence of the
rich0 The final form of words of the compromise established a
fund to create ",.,conditions which would make.. .investnient either
feasible or more effective",
How feasible has it proved in practice to separate, within
the multilateral aid system of the UN, the function of preparing
the ground for capital, from the actual provision of capital?
When discussing the capital-attracting performance of the UNDP's
Special Fund projects it is important to realise that only about
one third of the funds so far allocated have been to pre-
investment in the narrow sense of the term, i,e. to projects whose
objective is to identify opportunities, and prepare specific
proposals for capital investment, The remaining two thirds of the
UNDP s Special Fund resources have been fairly evenly divided
between the establishment or support of training institutions and
research-related projects0 Both of these two latter activities
can be (and are) represented as pre-investment in the sense that
they pave the way for indigenous management and support for
capital investment projects0 Yet their effectiveness cannot be
measured by any yardstick, as can, to some extent at least, the
one-third of the Programme devoted to survey-type projects, whose
results may be expressed in the form of an investment yield on a
pre-inves tment input.
As Taylor points out, the follow-up results of TJBDP's "survey
sector" have not been very impressive. So far, roughly $aoo
million spent on basic infrastructure, agricultural and natural
resource surveys has directly stimulated about $2.1 billion in
"follow-up" money. If one regards TJNDP's $800 million as "seed
money" (which Administrator Paul Hoffman does, at least for public
relations purposes), then clearly this 5 for 2 yield is unconvincing.
It is even less so when one realises that this return has been
achieved by a very high yield on a few prpjects, a large number of
survey project reports having attracted nothing but dust.
A brief examination of the sources of the $2.1 billion of
investment follow-up goes far to explain the reason f o this state
of affairs, More than two-thirds of this smc has been directly
provided, or stimulated by the World Bank Group, through Bank
loans, IDA credits, 'joint financing' organised by the governments,
At the same tine, only 24 per cent came from official and private
bilateral sources, which it must be remembered, account for almost
90 per cent of total external capital flows.
World Bank predominance in this investment follow-up has not
occurred simply through inertia or by thence. The link between
UNDP's Special Fund Sector and the Bank Group was a close one from
the start. From the earliest days of the Special Fund, an
informal arrangement has existed between the Bank and the IJNDP
whereby the Bank gives the UNDP the "right of first refusal" to
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finance its pre-investment surveys costing in excess of 100,000,
the government of the recipient country having submitted a formal
request for such assistance. Clearly this procedure, which
operates in the case of two-thirds of the TJNDP's survey-type
projects that have yielded fruit, requires nothing but paper-
processing by the UNDP, even though its results are set forth on
promotional literature as a major demonstration as to the
effectiveness of the Programme and the efficacy of the pre-
investment concept.
What about the other, and much larger, group of the TINDP's
survey-type projects which have yielded very little identifiable
fruit? Significantly, these were almost exclusively carried out
by the UN Specialised Agencies, whose approach Taylor characterises
as "more technically oriented than investment oriented, which has
led to the production of massive technical reports which are
'unbankable', i.e. which are almost totally devoid of the financial
data and analyses that they are needed for investment decision".
Taylor argues that the UNDP has not succeeded in filling the "pre-
investment vacuum" primarily because of "functional and professional
failure to carry the required pre-inveatment to the final stage,
that is, to produce fully bankable reports and feasibility studies
in a form suitable for investment decision. Curiously, however,
Taylor never questions the basic validity of the concept of
separating pre-investment from investment at a certain arbitrarily
defined stage.
Surely the relevant question that must be asked is, if a
compromise between rich and poor nations over the SUNFED had not
been necessary, would the pre-investment function ever have been
separated from investment? Surely, too, the only people who can
supply the answer are those responsible for making the loan or
credit commitments - the bankers themselves, whether public or
private, national or international. In the light of Taylor's
paper, I have discussed the question of separating the preparation
of a lending proposition from the banking decision with a number
of individuals in a variety of walks of banking. In each case,
the answer was unequivocal and the same, The decision as to what
is a 'bankable proposition' can only be made by a bank. Further-
more, as every bank, whether in the public or private sector, has
its own characteristics and requirements, it is generally infeasible
even for banking institutions with similar operations, character
and clientele to prepare loan proposals for one another. In the
case of consortia, agreement as to 'bankability' is arrived at by
a process or negotiation in which all parties participate actively.
All this is not to deny that UNDP has had, and continues to
have, an important role as an independent provider of surveys,
e.g. of mineral deposits, for countries that prefer not to trust
alternative (bilateral or Paris-club multilateral) sources of
help. Much was made of UNDP's potential in this area in its
earlier days, Clearly there have been cases in which this was a
governments initial motivation in go:ng to UNDP for a resource
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survey. But this type of broad-gauge operation, which TINDP
continues to be well-equipped to sponsor, cannot readily be
combined with the very specialised business of finding the funds,
and establishing the terms, for exploitation of the investment
opportunity. Appraisal of the political future of the government(or country) concerned is at least as important in 'bsikaiiility'
studies as technical knowledge of the economic potential of the
land or the people. This is not a role for which the 1J1DP is
politically suited. UNDP can, however, having revealed the extent
and quality of a natural resource, play a vital advisory role in
helping a developing country make choices between different types
and terms of external finance, as indeed between different alterna-
tives for the channelling of domestic savings.
Li practice the UNDP's specifically capital-attracting
function has been, and, in my view, is bound to be, the victim of
power realities which were glossed-over by General Assembly reso-
lution 1240. The current tendency for the pre-investment function
to merge with the investment function is the result. tJNDP's
failure to produce a supply of bankable' studies in its colla-
boration with agencies other than the World Bank, has led the Bank
to develop its own direct relations with individual Specialised
Agencies of the UN (UNESCO, FAO, WHO) on a bilateral basis, and
with impressive results. Moreover the World Bank's 'bilateral'
arrangements with other multilateral agencies produces feasibility
studies which are not made available to other sources of finance,
such as the regional development banks. Unable to get or accept
a "finished product" ready for financing from the UNDP, and without
access to the Bank's bilaterally-arranged feasibility studies, the
regional banks have chosen to finance and carry out their own
pre-inves tment work.
All of this may be seen as a World Bank drive for hegemony
with the multilateral development system. But equally it may be
seen as the logical outcome of bankers' refusal to take anyone
else's judgment but their own as to the security of their
depositors' money. What are the implications of this trend for
the future activities of UNDP? One possibility is that the present
tendency for the IJNDP to finance studies which are "second stage"
or even "third stage" follow-up on the broad-gauge findings of
earlier survey projects will continue, and that small-scale UNDP
projects shaped around a perceived financing possibility, will
proliferate. Although the survey-type share of UNDP-financed
activities has been declining gradually over recent years, this
trend of "probing towards bankability" has maintained a considerable
degree of momentum. The growth of pre-investment activities by
regional banks and other financing institutions has not so far
produced any noticeable shrinkage of tJNDP-financed activities in
this area, though there are sigma that this will be happening in
future.
Yet the problem remains that the UNDP's results - excluding
World Bank follow-up - are dismal in relation to resources expended.
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Various remedies have been suggested. Principally they concen-
trate on involving the World Bank and the regional development
banks more in the UNDP's project selection and preparation process.
I do not believe that such proposed remedies for the tTNDP's "pre-
investment vacuum" would help. Indeed I see danger in a protraction
of confusion as to the possible role of tThDP in directing resources
to specific projects and offering its politically pale blue flag as
a background to what will, in many cases, be distinctly dark blue
terms for financing. Naturally both donor governments and indi-
vidual investors would be delighted for the UNDP to play a greater
intermediary role in organising follow-up finance. But this could
so easily in practice mean persuading recipient countries to accept
terms of lending or investment heavily in favour of the financier.
If you cannot serve God and Mammon, can you play Minerva and
Panarus?
Finally, it must be observed that any attempt to define separate
technical assistance, pre-investment and investment functions contains
an element of unrealism., There is a strong capital content in many,
if not most, UNDP training and research, as well as survey projects,
in that the local counterpart contribution and the UNDP foreign
exchange input purchase significant capital installations in the
form of buildings and equipment. The fact that the average cost
of each of a number of UNDP-financed training centres is not more
than $2.5 million, whereas a single IDA credit for a school system
may run to $40 - Øso million demonstrates difference of scale but
scarcely of type as between capital aid and technical assistance.
Any discussion of appropriateness of roles for international
agencies must return to the central question cf their political
power relationship to one another, to which functional divisions
will always be subordinate. The fact of the matter is that UNDP
have a different political character and "flavour" both from
the specialised agencies individually, and the World Bank and
regional banks. Its peculiar blend of donor country financial
control through the voluntary nature of their contributions,
recipient country orientation (through the Third World majority
on the Governing Council) and Eastern European liaison and
affiliation dictates that this should be so,
Today TJNDP'S new scale is beginning to give this unique
character a chance to assert itself. The Programme's present
$240 million in annual contributions may well grow to a level of
over $soo million annually in the next four or five years. Can
a new order of magnitude give this "pre-invesLment" programme a
gravitational field which will alter its present relationship to
the development banks and other providers of capital aid? My
reasons for doubting this possibility are not altered by the IJVDP's
prospective expansion. Banks and companies will still insist
on control of the allocation of their depositors' or shareholders'
money, It therefore seems to me particularly important that
UNDP should concentrate on its task of promoting the multilateral
exchange of Iciowledge, skills and technical equipment between the
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First, Second and Third worlds, which is the one role to which
it is uniquely suited.
Other activities, which the UNDP may also be uniquely placed
to supervise in future should gradually be added. WDP should
prepare itself to vet, upon request, national development plans in
relation to regional and global considerations. This must mean
taking environmental and ecological considerations into account.
Another area of activity for which UNDP is potentially uniquely
equipped is that of giving international financial priority to
-training and research on global problems. Oceanic, atmospheric
and soil pollution, urban studies and general systems research are
sono of the areas to which WDP should direct research, training
and public attention, in addition to its current invaluable work
in building socio-economic infrastructures that can cope with
capital development.
Ail of these activities could, if necessary, be labelled pre-
investment, since -they are, or should be, the pro-condition to
future investments in development in all three worlds. Given the
foreseeable distribution of power and resources anong international
agencies, they would all be more fruitful areas for the TJNDPt5
attention than concern over a pre-investment vacuum which must, of
necessity, be filled by the investors of capital themselves,
